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The World in 2015: A Survey of Major Trends and Drivers 
 
 
The process of change is an ongoing one. Changes in government policies and the 
restructuring of firms and industries have been pursued to adapt to an increasingly 
global and highly competitive environment. Recent public policy debates have 
focused on what is likely to shape the global economy of the future. Broad social, 
geopolitical, environmental and economic trends including rapidly rising populations 
in some regions and declining populations in others combined with an ageing 
population, a degraded environment, and pressures on natural resources present 
serious challenges while changing consumption patterns in a growing global market, 
market deregulation and the rapid pace of technological innovation provide 
opportunity. Identifying relevant trends and drivers would assist government and 
businesses develop policies and strategies to navigate through change.  This paper 
provides a discussion of these emerging trends and drivers which are of critical 
importance for the future.  
 
 
GLOBAL SOCIAL TRENDS 
Demographic Trends. Based on the US Bureau of Census estimates, world 
population in 2015 is forecast to be 7.2 billion, up from 6.1 billion in 2000, an average 
annual growth rate of 1.1 per cent (Table 1). The rate of world population growth, 
however, will have diminished from 1.7 per cent annually in 1985, to 1.2 per cent in 
2000 to approximately 1 per cent in 2015— a slowing population growth.  In most 
countries, people will have fewer children and live longer. 
 
Table 1.  Population Growth Estimates, % change over previous year  
Sources: US Bureau of Census (http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsprd.html); Asian Development 
Bank, (http://aric.adb.org/index.asp); 
 
Ninety-five per cent of the increase in population will be in developing countries, 
particularly in rapidly expanding urban areas, creating ‘mega cities’ those 
containing more than 10 million inhabitants. The explosive growth of cities in 
 Historical Trends Forecasts 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-
2015 
Australia 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
US 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Europe 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Japan 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.04 0.0 -0.03 -0.07 -0.2 
China 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Korea 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 
India 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 
Rest of Asia 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 
WORLD 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
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developing countries will challenge governments in providing jobs, social services 
and infrastructure necessary to sustain liveable and stable environments.  
 
In some developing countries, the combination of population growth and increasing 
lifespan will expand the size of the working population and the potential for economic 
growth (NIC, 2000). By 2015, nearly half of the world’s population will be accounted 
for by China at 1.4 billion and India at 1.2 billion. These two countries will have the 
highest rates of population growth, although slowing, among developing countries. 
 
For the next 10 years or so, India will be greying into middle age, while China will 
grey into old age. Nearly 400 million Chinese will be over 65 by 2020 and the 
consequences of a serious gender imbalance caused by China’s one-child policy could 
have increasing political, social and even international repercussions. An unfunded 
nationwide pension arrangement means many Chinese will have to continue to work 
into old age (Eberstadt, 2004; NIC, 2004). 
 
In developed economies, there will be ageing but wealthy populations. Ageing and 
declining birth rates will combine to increase healthcare and pension costs while 
reducing the relative size of the working population. As a consequence, there will be a 
“war” for talent, leaving significant shortfalls in the size and capacity of the 
workforce. Developed country governments will seek to mitigate the problem through 
such measures as delaying retirement, encouraging greater participation in the 
workforce by women, and relying on migrant workers. Migration has the potential to 
help solve the problem of a declining work force in Europe and to a lesser extent, 
Japan. With its population ageing rapidly, Japan will require a big number of new 
workers by 2015 to maintain current dependency ratios between the working 
population and retirees. By 2030, some estimates suggest that half the working-age 
population of Europe will be composed of immigrants. The US and Australia will 
continue to have the highest rates of population growth among developed economies.  
 
With migration on the increase — from Latin America and East and South Asia to 
North America, and from North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the post-
Communist states of Eastern Europe to Europe — countries will have significant 
differences in ethnic composition and cultural norms and will face the challenge of 
integrating migrants into their societies while respecting their ethnic and religious 
identities (NIC 2000; 2004). 
 
Consumption Trends. Dixon (2003) predicts that there will be big demographic and 
social shifts affecting every aspect of consumer behaviour. In developing countries, a 
significant structural change in food consumption will occur due to urbanisation and 
income growth. An accelerated economic growth, especially if it becomes broad 
based, is likely to change dietary preference. The composition of the food basket will 
change with shifts in diets from rice and other grains to wheat, driving up per capita 
wheat consumption steadily by 2015.  A dietary shift towards egg, meat (particularly 
poultry and pig meat) and dairy products will also translate into an increase in the 
consumption of corn used for animal feeds. By 2015, per capita consumption of 
livestock products could rise by 44 per cent and global meat consumption is forecast 
to grow by 2 per cent annually until the end of 2015. Poultry consumption will grow 
fastest (FAO, 2002). Most of this increase will occur in the developing world where 
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consumption to 2015 is expected to grow by 2.7 per cent per year, compared to 0.6 
per cent per year in developed countries. 
In addition, projected higher population growth will increase the pressure on food 
demand. However, even with the growing population, world food supply will be 
sufficient to feed the global population. With the limited availability of land (due to 
competing uses) combined with declining agricultural productivity in developing 
countries, cereal production is not expected to keep pace with demand. For instance, 
the World Bank is forecasting that China’s net grain imports will rise to 19 million 
tonnes in 2010 and 32 million tonnes in 2020. On the other hand, global production of 
meat will increase at a similar rate to demand and that with progressive reductions in 
trade barriers so will trade in meat and meat products. It is highly likely that 
developing countries will depend increasingly on imported food to meet domestic 
requirements producing a growing trade deficit. In particular, net imports of cereals 
and livestock products will continue to rise quite rapidly (FAO, 2002).  
Another significant change in consumption is a consequence of a growing middle 
class. China’s middle class could make up as much as 40 per cent of its population by 
2015. In India, there are now estimated to be some 300 million middle-income earners 
and this number is likely to rise rapidly by 2015. The income earned by middle 
income earners of US$2,000 to US$4,000 a year is considered sufficient enough to 
spur car purchases in Asia. Thus, rapidly rising income levels for a growing middle 
class will mean a huge consumption explosion, particularly of luxury goods. 
The current explosion of economic openness and regionalism through preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) has become increasingly prominent in the international trade 
environment. Through 2015, the world is predicted to see more of this happening as 
countries in the world economy become more interdependent and interconnected. The 
potential for trade blocs to snowball and the fear of being “left in the cold” will drive 
the growth and formation of free trade areas and customs unions. It is more apparent 
that “snowballing” ultimately will lead to a beggar-thy-neighbour world full of 
exclusive PTAs rather than to a world with multilaterally freer trade. At the firm 
level, with the world as its market, the scale of production and operations will 
undergo a dramatic increase making locational resource and supply considerations 
relevant (Lazer, 1999). 
 
Social Activism. Private sector organisations — both for profit and nonprofit — 
increasingly will gain resources and power over the next ten years or so as a result of 
globalisation, dispersion of technologies and the ongoing liberalisation of global 
finance and trade.  
 
The for –profit business sector will grow rapidly over the next 10 years, spearheading 
legal and judicial reform and demanding from governments to be more transparent 
and predictable. At the same time, governments will be asked to monitor and regulate 
business firms through measures consistent with economic policies. The increasing 
number in multinational corporations will continue as governments continue to 
deregulate their economies, privatise state-owned enterprises, and liberalise financial 
markets and trade. In many countries, medium-sized and small local businesses will 
also increase in number not only because of deregulation and liberalisation but also 
due to governments’ inability to thwart small-scale commercial activities. As these 
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businesses grow in number, they will encourage, and then link into, various global 
networks. Accompanying this trend is the increasing number of shareholders who will 
be vocal and demand greater participation in decision-making.  
Over the next ten years or so, the non-profit sector particularly the non-government 
organisations (NGOs) will not only expand but change in significant ways. They will 
be more global in nature with affiliates in more than one country, addressing cross-
border issues and representing cross-border communities of interest. More effective 
use of the internet will enable the rapid mobilisation of their global constituencies. It 
is often claimed that with modern communications, it is very simple for small, local 
causes to find global resonance, and this is sometimes seen as a major threat to firms, 
particularly resources firms, often operating in developing countries with less than 
savoury local governments as partners.  
NGOs will be more effective in the next decade as they work together in coalitions, 
pooling their resources and coordinating their lobbying efforts. The NGO networks 
will be increasingly organised allowing them to coordinate their actions in many 
countries and at international conferences and negotiations (Paul, 2000). 
According to the National Intelligence Council (2000; 2004), NGOs will have more 
resources to expand their activities and will become more confident of their power 
and more confrontational. They will move beyond delivering services and advocacy 
missions to global decision-making, that is, the design and implementation of policies, 
whether as partners or competitors with governments or private businesses. NGOs 
will increasingly influence both the behaviour of corporations and of government 
policy. 
Based on a study by the United Nations and SustainAbility (2003), international 
NGOs will face a huge opportunity to massively increase their impact by focusing 
their efforts on reforming market systems rather than simply confronting them. Public 
and private sector partnerships will increasingly become essential for NGOs to 
leverage change. This is not to say that the next decade will be characterised by no 
conflict between NGOs and governments and corporations (e.g., resource companies), 
at either the local or the global level. Socio-economic shocks will cause uncertainties 
in power balances.  However, it does mean that such conflicts are likely to be 
substantially fewer in number and less intense in nature. 
In addition, NGOs will be expected to meet codes of conduct in the future, by 
subjecting them to some type of control, such as registration and financial oversight. 
Governments and private businesses — which are increasingly held to standards of 
transparency and accountability — will, in turn, expect NGOs to meet similar 
standards. While markets and business engagement represent an opportunity for 
NGOs, in order to exploit this, NGOs will have to address three critical challenges 
around their accountability, financing and partnerships. 
Technology and the knowledge economy. Very few people predicted the boundless 
impact of the information technology revolution in the past. Looking forward, the 
trend toward rapid, global diffusion of technology will continue producing significant 
efficiency gains to the global economy. These efficiency gains will benefit many 
countries— although in varying degrees, as the integration of new technologies to 
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production processes proceeds. The greatest benefits will accrue to countries that can 
access and adopt new technologies. Indeed, a country’s level of technological 
achievement generally will be defined in terms of its investment in integrating and 
applying the new, globally available technologies, whether the technologies are 
acquired through a country’s own R&D or from technology leaders (NIC, 2000).  
The world will encounter more quantum leaps in information technology and in other 
areas of science and technology such as biotechnology, materials sciences, and 
nanotechnology. The effects of such developments will be profound on business and 
commerce, public health, and safety. New technology applications will foster 
dramatic improvements in human knowledge and individual well-being. It will 
improve the overall quality of life of many. Such benefits include medical 
breakthroughs that begin to cure or mitigate some common diseases and lengthen 
lifespan, applications that improve food and potable water production, expansion of 
wireless communications and language translation technologies that will facilitate 
transnational business, commercial and even social and political relationships, and 
products that are smart, multifunctional, environmentally compatible and 
customisable (NIC, 2004). 
The impact of innovation in science and technology is unfathomable.  For instance, 
over the next 10 or 15 years, a wide range of developments will lead to many IT-
enabled devices and services which can be used in business operations.  Local-to-
global internet access will lead to an expansion of wireless connectivity via hand-held 
devices and large numbers of low-cost low altitude satellites. Satellite systems and 
services will develop in ways that increase performance and reduce costs.  
The global economy will be one of a knowledge economy driven by rapid flows of 
information, ideas, cultural values, capital, goods and services, and people. . In the 
knowledge economy, technology and know-how will be more crucial factors of 
production than other economic resources. They will play the predominant part in the 
creation of wealth1.  
With these technological advances, countries will face serious challenges in oversight, 
control and prohibition of sensitive technologies. Questions concerning a country’s 
ethical practices in the technology realm may become an increasingly important issue 




Energy security. Energy is vital to stability in the global economy. Where supplies 
are vulnerable to disruption, energy security problems arise. This is perhaps most 
evident regarding oil dependency (Fig. 1). Future concern about energy security will 
continue to centre around world dependence on oil from the Middle East.  The share 
of the Middle East in world production is set to increase from 29 per cent in 2000 to 
37 per cent in 2020, with the key Middle East members accounting for almost all of 
the change.  
 
While world reliance on oil from the Middle East is increasing, this needs to be placed 
into context. Past disruptions in Middle Eastern supplies have had a relatively small 
impact on global oil flows. While countries had to face price increases in oil, access to 
oil has not been a major problem. Supplies have been maintained (Fig. 2).  World 
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crude oil prices, while fluctuating over time, have declined in real terms over the last 
decades, notwithstanding recent sharp price increases.  Part of the reason is that 
additional discoveries have increased world stocks of oil. Despite increasing demand 
for oil, there are sufficient reserves to supply world demand for around 40 years. 
 
 
Figure 1: Net Import Dependency for Crude oil, Coal and Natural Gas, 2000 
 
 
Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of Countries 2002 Review 
 
 
Another source of energy disruption is related to its delivery, where the potential for 
terrorist acts has increased. Despite some progress on alternatives, oil will continue to 
fuel industrialisation. Much of the oil is transported through fairly precarious means. 
Crude flows through pipelines and petroleum is transported through a number of oil 
tanker channels.  These delivery systems will be vulnerable to disruption.  
 
Figure 2 World oil supply disruptions 
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Note: Short fall in supply shown as percentage of pre-disruption world supply. 
Source: International Energy Agency.  
 
To avoid such disruptions in less than ten years time, countries would have invested 
in approaches to make the supply less risky. These approaches will include 
diversification of suppliers, the development of new and sustainable supply systems, 
the establishment of stockpiles to cover demand if supply is interrupted, and the 
attempt to reduce the likelihood of supply disruptions. In the long term, geographic 
diversification of the world’s oil supplies will not be easily achieved, since the 
world’s reserves will increasingly be concentrated in the Middle East. 
 
Transport Issues. Logistical problems will come to the fore in the next ten years or 
so, as ocean freight rates soar, while port congestion disrupt supply chains. Freight 
rates for bulk commodities (as represented by the Baltic Dry Index) will further surge 
because of the continuing increase in volume of global trade in major raw materials. 
With very little sign of China’s growth abating, rapidly rising cargo volumes to and 
from China raise the issue of port bottlenecks. Congestion problems are already 
occurring with cargo choking the quaysides and ships being forced to wait outside 
port limits for berths to clear. Indeed, insufficient through-transport capacity caused a 
drop in iron ore imports into China in mid-2004, as an estimated 25 million tonnes of 
ore clogged Chinese ports following unbridled imports. At the same time, deficient 
capacity on China’s overstretched rail network was being blamed for coal shortages 
throughout the country (The Baltic, 2004a). 
 
China’s ports will face the further risk of being overwhelmed by double-digit port 
container throughput growth, from 48 million TEU in 2003 to 120 million TEU in 
2010 (The Baltic, 2004b) and that its internal infrastructure will be inadequate to meet 
the demands that will be made of it. The hefty increase in demand for port and port-
related infrastructure will spark heavy investment, not just in facilities at existing 
ports, but in entirely new ports particularly in the container sector. There is no doubt 
that the Chinese ports sector will be a booming market, and will attract plenty of 
investment. With demand for port services predicted to continue to increase sharply, 
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and with congestion problems already manifest, the question remain whether China 
can expand its existing ports and build new ports as quickly as it needs them.  
 
Global Security and Terrorism. A more pervasive sense of insecurity, which may 
be as much based on psychological perceptions as physical threats, is foreseen by 
2020, according to the views of the National Intelligence Council (2004). The world 
will see a relative decline, perhaps even extinction of “ideological” terrorism that 
brought about hijackings and bombings beginning around 1968 perpetrated by such 
groups as Red Army Faction, Red Brigades, Japanese Red Army, etc. The well of 
support for Marxist-based ideology will dry up (Pollard, 2004). 
 
The threat of terrorism will come from ethno-religious conflicts. It will likely to 
increase in scope and the majority of international terrorist groups will continue to 
identify with radical Islam (Copley, 2004). The revival of Muslim identity will create 
a framework for the spread of radical Islamic ideology and will continue to be 
accompanied by a deepening solidarity among Muslims caught up in national or 
regional separatists struggle against government repression, corruption, and 
ineffectiveness. There are indications that the Islamic radicals will create a trans-
national insurgency by overthrowing a number of allegedly apostate secular 
governments with predominantly Muslim subjects.  
 
Pressures from global counterterrorism effort and the impact of advances in 
information technology will cause terrorist threat to become increasingly 
decentralised, forming into an eclectic array of groups, cells and individuals. Planning 
and carrying out of operations by terrorist groups will become virtual (i.e., online). 
The rapid proliferation of advanced technology will significantly increase the threat 
posed by missiles and weapons of mass destruction which will add to the pervasive 
sense of insecurity.  Terrorists are likely to employ advanced explosives and 
unmanned aerial vehicles. Terrorist use of biological agents is likely. It is also 
expected that terrorists will try to acquire and develop the capabilities to conduct 
cyber attacks to cause physical damage to computer systems and to disrupt critical 
information networks.  
Risk of war among developed countries will probably decrease over the next decade, 
but the international community will likely confront relatively frequent internal 
conflicts and less frequent regional interstate wars.  Internal conflicts stemming from 
religious, ethnic, economic, or political disputes will remain at current levels or 
increase. Those countries most susceptible to this type of conflict are the sub-Saharan 
Africa, through North Africa, into the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and 
South and Central Asia, and through parts of Southeast Asia. The potential for 
conflict will arise from rivalries in Asia specifically, India-Pakistan and China-
Taiwan and among numerous antagonists in the Middle East. Conflicts of this type 
will be made worse by availability of more lethal weapons of mass destruction, longer 
range missile delivery systems and other technologies. 
Arms and weapons technology transfers will be more difficult to control. Over the 
next 10 to 15 years, a number of countries will continue to pursue their nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons programs and in some cases will enhance their 
capabilities.  Countries will continue to integrate both chemical and biological 
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weapon production into apparently legitimate commercial infrastructures, further 
concealing them from scrutiny. 
In the realm of war and military affairs, the US will be the heavyweight champion, 
maintaining a strong technological edge in information heavy battlefield awareness 
and precision guided weaponry. Given its decisive edge in both information and 
weapons technology, as well as its economic power, t the United States will maintain 
a dominant world position (if it wants to do so). America will remain in the vanguard 
of the technological revolution from information to biotechnology and beyond. A few 
countries will maintain large military forces with a mix of Cold War and post-Cold 
War concepts and technologies, posing a credible challenge to US might. 
Terrorism and internal conflicts will significantly increase the security costs 
associated with international commerce, encouraging restrictive border control 
policies, and adversely affecting trade patterns and financial markets.  
Threat of Pandemics. In today’s world of global jet travel and the transportation of 
vast quantities of goods from all corners of the globe, there is no longer any capacity 
to isolate ecology of one part of the globe from another.  This will mean that a 
disease, developing anywhere in the world will soon be found everywhere. Any lethal 
disease will eventually “burn itself out” among its endemic population, but if its 
transmission is faster than at which it consumes its host, the result will be a widening 
circle of disease. This has been proven many times in the past, seemingly whenever 
there are large or new movements of populations. Despite the advances in science and 
the increasing confidence in the ability to master micro-predators, it will be apparent 
that with the emergence of AIDS and drug-resistant tuberculosis, and lack of progress 
in many other infectious diseases, the age of pandemics will not disappear.  
 
Progress against infectious diseases will encounter setbacks as a result of growing 
microbial resistance to antibiotics, urbanisation and the emergence of megacities and 
the intensification of mobility of populations and products. Although, the response to 
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) showed that international surveillance and 
control mechanisms are becoming more adept at containing diseases, and new 
developments in biotechnologies hold the promise of continued improvement. 
Medical research and health care systems will continually be confronted with 
treatment-resistant new diseases or new versions of old diseases (Mendelson and 
Divinsky, 2002; Nichol, et. al., 2000).  
 
Disparities in health systems between countries will persist and widen.  In developed 
countries, major breakthroughs against a variety of maladies will be achieved by 2015 
as a result of generous health spending and major medical advances. Non-infectious 
diseases will pose greater challenges to health in developed countries than will 
infectious diseases. In contrast, developing countries are likely to experience a surge 
in both types of diseases and will have inadequate health care capacities and spending 
to tackle the situation (NIC, 2004).  
 
Although tuberculosis, malaria, hepatitis and AIDS will continue to increase rapidly, 
other diseases will come to the fore. Based on a study on emerging viral diseases 
(Horimoto and Kawaoka, 2001) apart from the current influenza being caused by an 
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ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS  
Energy. The global economy will continue to become more energy efficient through 
2015.  One of the most significant energy-related developments in the last 20 years 
has been the significant reduction in energy intensity in developed countries. At the 
same time, there has been a movement of energy-intensive industries to developing 
countries. In some developing economies, reduction in energy intensity has started to 
occur because of technological modernisation. For instance, the reduction in energy 
intensity in China, Asia’s largest energy consumer, has been attributed much more to 
improving technical efficiency than to changes in economic structure (Zhong, 2001). 
Higher income levels could lead to the diffusion of more technologically 
sophisticated, but less energy intensive, machines such as the trend occurring in the 
home appliances sector, where new models are more energy efficient than earlier 
models. In part, this reflects the imposition of efficiency standards by governments.  
 
Energy production will also become more efficient. Technological applications, 
particularly in deep-water exploration and production will open remote and hostile 
areas to petroleum production hence increasing the world’s total production of oil. 
The Persian Gulf region will see large increases in oil production capacity and will 
rise in its overall importance in the world energy market.  Other energy sources 
including Russia, coastal West Africa and Greenland will also play a significant role 
in global energy markets.  Latin America has more than 117 billion barrels of proven 
oil reserves and potentially 114 billion barrels of undiscovered oil (USGS, 2000).  
Caspian energy development will likely to be active in 2015 with new transport routes 
operating. 
 
Total oil demand will increase from 75 million barrels a day in 2000 to more than 100 
million barrels in 2015. Natural gas usage will increase more rapidly than that of any 
other energy source, by more than 100 per cent mainly due to the tripling of gas 
consumption in Asia.  
 
Asia will drive expansion in energy demand, replacing North America as the leading 
energy consumer. China, and to a lesser extent India, will experience dramatic 
increases in energy consumption. Europe’s energy requirements are unlikely to grow 
to the same extent as those of the developing countries, in part because of Europe’s 
expected lower economic growth and the more efficient use of energy. 
 
Based on a study conducted by the US National Intelligence Council (2000; 2004), 
despite a 50 per cent increase in global energy demand as a result of high economic 
and population growth to 2015, energy resources will be sufficient to meet demand. 
The latest estimates suggest 80 per cent of the world’s available oil and 95 per cent of 
its gas remain untapped.  
 
By 2015, global energy markets will be divided into two quasi-hemispheric patterns.  
Asia’s energy needs will be serviced either through coal from the region or from oil 
and gas supplies from the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Russia. On the other hand, 
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Western Europe and the Western hemisphere will draw on the Atlantic Basin for their 
energy sources at world prices. Hence, it is forecast that three-quarters of Persian Gulf 
oil will be directed to Asia and only one-tenth to the western markets. The increased 
global demand, especially from China meant oil prices would stay well above the 
1990s levels for the long term. 
 
Water. The United Nations (2003) claims that the world is currently facing a serious 
water crisis.  All the signs suggest that it is getting worse and will continue to do so in 
the next decade or so, unless corrective action is taken. This crisis is one of water 
governance caused mainly by the ways in which water is mismanaged — wrong 
policies and weak institutions. Better water management, such as liberalisation of the 
water sector, better valuation of water, and more private sector involvement, could 
bring forward new technology and infrastructure that will be able to address the 
growing per capita scarcity of water in many parts of the developing world.  
 
Although water is widely occurring, only 2.5 per cent of the earth’s water is fresh 
water while the rest is salt water. Some two-thirds of this freshwater is locked up in 
glaciers and permanent snow cover while other freshwater resources are further 
reduced by pollution. Moreover, recent estimates suggest that climate change will 
account for about 20 per cent of the increase in global water scarcity. There are huge 
differences in freshwater availability in different parts of the world. Table 2 presents a 
global overview of freshwater availability and the distribution of population. It 
stresses the continental disparities, and in particular the pressure put on the Asian 
continent which supports more than half of the world’s population with only 36 per 
cent of the world’s water resources. Pressures on the water system will further 
increase with population growth and economic development leading to critical 
challenges in coping with progressive water shortages and water pollution. The UN 
estimates that by 2050, at worst 7 billion people in 60 countries will be water scarce, 
at best 2 billion people in 48 countries. 
 
Table 2.  Water availability and population, 2003 
 Population 
(% of world population) 
Water Availability 
(% of world’s freshwater) 
North and Central America 8 15 
South America 6 26 
Europe 13 8 
Africa 13 11 
Asia 60 36 
Australia and Oceania <1 5 
Source: UNESCO, 2003. 
 
In addition, the NIC (2004) suggests that by 2015, water scarcities and allocation will 
pose significant challenges to governments, particularly in the Middle East, Sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia and northern China. These countries will be “water-
stressed”, having less than 1,700 cubic metres of water per capita per year. For 
instance, the water table under some of the major grain-producing areas in northern 
China is falling at a rate of five feet per year, and water tables throughout India is 
falling an average of 3 to 10 feet per year. 
 
According to the UNECE (2004) and the NIC (2000; 2004), as water supplies run out, 
water management could become a source of disputes between countries. Regional 
tensions over water will intensify as measures undertaken to increase water 
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availability and ease water shortages will not be sufficient to substantially change the 
outlook for water shortages in 2015. Although no water dispute has been a cause of 
open interstate conflict in the past, but as countries press against the limits of 
available water, the possibility of conflict will increase.  
 
Looking at history, however, Wolf (1992) noted that there is an inverse relationship 
between level of violence and level of water conflict.  In other words, people will kill 
each other around the water hole but are increasingly reluctant to do so as conflict 
grows into a national and international issue. Indeed, water may actually be one of 
humanity’s great learning grounds for building community. Water agreements have 
actually prevented major conflicts such as on the subcontinent between Pakistan and 
India. Since 1945 approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or 
allocations in international basins have been negotiated. Water sharing plans and 
infrastructure networks have fostered interdependence (Priscoli, 1998). 
 
Climate change and biodiversity. Contemporary environmental problems will 
persist and in many instances grow over the next ten years. With the booming global 
economic outlook, greenhouse gas emissions will initially increase substantially but 
will decrease eventually as a result of less energy-intensive economic development 
and technological advances. For example, advances in the efficiency of energy use 
and the shift to less polluting fuels, such as natural gas will contribute to this trend. 
 
The consensus on the need to tackle environmental issues will strengthen but progress 
in dealing with them will be patchy.  As countries’ incomes rise, governments can 
afford to give greater priority to environmental quality. Some of the poorest countries 
may opt to become pollution havens.  The countries where industrialisation is most 
rapid but incomes are still low may face environmental deterioration.  The rich 
countries may opt to improve their environments (Collier and Dollar, 2001). 
 
Developing countries will face intensified environmental problems as a result of 
population growth, economic development and rapid urbanisation. Deforestation and 
habitat destruction will accelerate and lead to the loss of sustainable supply of forest 
products, hydrological impacts such as flooding, will reduce biodiversity and increase 
net greenhouse gas emissions. Megacities will face serious air and water quality 
problems. On the other hand, developed countries will continue to manage 
environmental issues which are unlikely to affect their economic growth and health 
standards given that they already have the technologies and techniques to solve many 
environmental problems. Environmental issues will become mainstream issues, 
particularly in developed countries. 
 
Some existing environmental agreements, even when implemented by 2015, will not 
be able to reverse the targeted environmental damage they were designed to address. 
While the1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer were important 
steps to international action, the total chlorine loading of the atmosphere of ozone-
depleting substances has continued and will continue to rise. The 1979 Convention on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution and its protocols have established a regional 
regime in Europe and North America.  It has been extended by eight protocols that 
identify specific measures to be taken by parties. The Protocol on Heavy Metals 
adopted in 1998 has a direct impact on resource companies which targets three 
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particular harmful metals: cadmium, lead and mercury. Parties to this agreement will 
have to reduce their emissions for the metals below their levels in 1990. The Protocol 
aims to cut emissions from industrial sources (iron and steel industry, non-ferrous 
metal industry), combustion processes (power generation, road transport) and waste 
incineration. It also requires the phase out leaded petrol. It introduces measures to 
lower heavy metal emissions from other products, such as mercury in batteries, and 
proposes the introduction of management measures for other mercury-containing 
products, such as electrical components (thermostats, switches), measuring devices 
(thermometers, manometers, barometers), fluorescent lamps, dental amalgam, 
pesticides and paint.  The Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants adopted in 1998 
will fall short in meeting its objectives. It focuses on a list of 16 substances that have 
been singled out. It bans the production and use of some products outright (aldrin, 
chlordane, chlordecone, dieldrin, endrin, hexabromobiphenyl, mirex and toxaphene) 
and others are scheduled for elimination at a later stage (DDT, heptachlor, 
hexaclorobenzene, PCBs). Important new agreements will be implemented making 
the abovementioned protocols global treaties (UNECE, 2004). 
 
Despite mounting efforts over the past 20 years to conserve biological diversity, its 
loss, mainly from habitat destruction, over-harvesting, pollution, atmospheric change, 
and the introduction of inappropriate plants and animals, has continued.  The major 
issue that has prevented the conservation of biodiversity concerns how countries can 
act effectively and cooperatively, to provide for economic activity while preserving 
biological resources from degradation or elimination. The Convention on Biodiversity 
has three general goals of conservation of, sustainable use of, and equal benefits from 
biodiversity. It provides guiding principles for the preservation of biodiversity and it 
requires that parties carry out national biodiversity assessments and have conservation 
strategies. However, the measures needed to protect biological diversity may prove 
difficult to achieve, given the very broad array of human activities that cause 
extinctions: clearing land for agriculture or settlements, using chemicals that 
unexpectedly kill various species, draining swamps and other wetlands, disposal of 
various wastes, and many others. The objectives to improve the conservation of 
biological diversity and the sustainable use of biological resources under the 
Convention will not be fully met in around ten years time.  
 
Global warming will challenge the international community as indications of a 
warming climate occur. The Kyoto Protocol represented a valuable first step in taking 
international action to reduce the rate of global warming. The Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change, which mandates emission-reduction targets for developed countries, 
is unlikely to be ratified in its present form. In the absence of a formal treaty, 
however, some progress will still be made in reducing the growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  International firms will take steps to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions and so will some developing countries such as India and China which will 
actively explore less carbon-intensive development strategies. 
World carbon dioxide emissions are expected to increase by 1.9 per cent annually 
between 2001 and 2025. Much of the increase in these emissions is expected to occur 
in developing countries where booming economies, such as China and India, fuel 
economic development with fossil energy. Developing countries’ emissions are 
expected to grow above the world average at 2.7 per cent annually between 2001 and 
2025 and surpass emissions of developed countries by 2018 (EIA, 2005).  
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ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS 
The global economy. The global economy is well positioned to achieve a sustained 
period of dynamism through 2015. Global economic growth will return to the high 
levels reached in the 1960s and early 1970s. As seen in recent years, global recovery 
has become increasingly well established and is poised to grow at almost 4 per cent 
per annum in the next 10 years. By 2020, the world economy is projected to be about 
80 per cent larger than it was in 2000 and average per capita income to be 
approximately 50 per cent higher.  
 
Developing countries are predicted to turn in the strongest economic growth through 
2015, led by China and India although growth projections are likely to be more 
subdued in 2005 and beyond, as world growth prospects have turned less favourable 
in the light of upward trends in world interest rates and the persistently strong oil 
prices (Table 3). The current strength of oil prices has led to a build up of inflationary 
pressures in many countries. Inflation is expected to pick up slightly in 2004 and 2005 
but going forward it is predicted to trend downwards (Table 4). 
 
Table 3.  Real GDP Growth Estimates (Consensus Forecasts), % change over previous year  
 
 Historical Trends Forecasts 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-
2015 
Australia 3.6 2.5 3.9 3.0 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 
US 3.7 0.8 1.9 3.0 4.4 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 
Europe* 3.5 1.6 0.8 0.5 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Japan 2.8 0.4 -0.3 2.5 4.3 1.8 1.8 1.2 2.1 2.1 1.7 
China 8.0 7.3 8.2 9.1 9.1 8.0 7.9 8.2 8.0 7.6 7.7 
Korea (Rep. of) 8.5 3.8 7.0 3.1 4.9 4.4 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.4 4.6 
India 4.4 5.8 4.0 8.2 6.0 6.5 6.6 6.9 7.1 6.6 6.8 
Rest of Asia* 7.4 2.6 3.6 4.0 6.6 4.8 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.0 4.9 
WORLD 4.2 3.9 3.0 3.9 4.6 4.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.4 
Note: * Europe only includes the Euro zone countries; Rest of Asia was averaged from growth rates of 
6 Asian countries  Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand;  
Source: Consensus Economics. 
 
Most forecasts to 2020 and beyond continue to show higher annual growth for 
developing countries than for developed ones. Dynamism will be strongest among so-
called “emerging markets” — especially in China and India — but will be broadly 
based world-wide, including in both developed and developing countries. China and 
India will be in a position to achieve higher economic growth than Europe and Japan, 
whose ageing work forces may inhibit their growth.  
 
Political pressures for higher living standards will drive economic growth with a 
growing global middle class creating a cycle of rising aspirations.  Other factors that 
will combine to promote economic growth include improved macroeconomic policies, 
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rising foreign trade and investment, the diffusion of information technologies and an 
increasingly dynamic private sector.1   
 
Economic liberalisation and globalisation entail risks and inevitably will create bumps 
on the road, some of them potentially disruptive. The global economy will be prone to 
periodic financial crises but its capacity to correct itself will remain strong. A 
prolonged disruption of energy supplies can also be a potential brake on the global 
economy. Conflict among key energy producing states, sustained internal instability 
in two or more major energy-producing states, or major terrorist actions could lead to 
such a disruption.  Although the world economy is less vulnerable to energy price 
swings than in the 1970s, a major disruption in global energy supplies still would 
have a devastating effect. 
 
Table 4.  Inflation (Consensus Forecasts), % consumer price change over previous year 
 Historical Trends Forecasts 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-
2015 
Australia 4.5 4.4 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.5 
US 3.4 2.8 1.6 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Europe 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 
Japan -0.7 -0.7 -1.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.4 1.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 
China 0.4 0.7 -0.8 1.2 4.1 3.5 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.6 
Korea (Rep. of) 2.3 4.1 2.7 3.6 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.9 
India 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.3 
Rest of Asia 1.0 2.3 1.8 1.2 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 
WORLD 4.7 4.5 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Source: Consensus Economics. 
 
China. Following several years of exceptionally rapid economic expansion, China’s 
economy has not showed signs of slowing down. High GDP growth has been 
accompanied by a strong upturn in industrial production and global trade flows (Table 
5). Despite the policy-induced slowdown in 2004, China will remain one of the fastest 
growing economies with real GDP growth forecast of 8.0per cent per year on average 
through 2015. China’s high growth forecast is expected to remain in the next decade, 
especially with higher infrastructure and capital spending planned for the 2008 
Olympic Games. As a result, China is expected to account for 20 per cent of global 
income in 2015 (on a purchasing power parity basis). To the degree that China 
implements reforms mandated by its entry into the World Trade Organisation, its 
economy will become more efficient, enabling rapid growth to continue. China will 
be well integrated into the world economy through foreign direct investment, trade 
and international capital markets in a decade’s time. China’s expanding share of 




                                                 
1 http://www.futurestudies.co.uk/predictions/089_pdf. 
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Table 5.  China: key economic indicators 
 Historical Trends Forecasts 
% change over previous 
year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-
2015 
Real GDP  8.0 7.3 8.2 9.1 9.1 8.0 7.9 8.2 8.0 7.6 7.7 
Industrial production  11.4 9.9 12.6 17.0 16.0 12.8 11.8 13.0 13.7 12.1 12.2 
Consumer Prices 0.4 0.7 -0.8 1.2 4.1 3.5 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.6 
Population  0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Current Account 
Balance (US$bn) 
20.5 17.4 35.4 45.9 25.6 23.5 13.3 9.1 3.7 2.0 5.5 
Source: Consensus Economics. 
 
China’s economic development, however, will be mainly in the dynamic eastern 
coastal region encompassing the provinces from Shandong in the north to Guangdong 
in the south and including the municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. 
Agricultural provinces in northern and western China will lag behind causing social 
tensions that Beijing will be challenged to manage.  
 
Another future challenge to the Chinese government will concern its currency which 
it continues to peg to the US dollar. Many governments, particularly the American and 
European, which will see further widening of their current account deficits against 
China, will strongly argue that the Chinese yuan, pegged for a decade at 8.28 to the 
US dollar, is undervalued, and that a revaluation is essential. Calls for China to 
change its exchange rate regime will get louder as tensions increase.  The Chinese 
government will agree that in the medium term it needs to set its currency free. But it 
will be unlikely to allow a free float until it has reformed its banking sector. Hence, a 
full liberalisation of the exchange rate will still be some way off given the fragility of 
the banking system. China will gradually move towards a more flexible exchange rate 
regime, but foreign pressure would not force China to move faster to free its exchange 
rate.  
 
Given its enormous population and assuming a reasonable degree of real currency 
appreciation, the dollar value of China’s gross national product may be the second 
largest in the world by 2020. Wilson and Purushothaman (2003) predict that China 
could overtake Germany by 2007, Japan by 2015 and the US by 2039. Indeed, by 
2041 China would become the world’s largest economy.2  
 
India. India will emerge as another economic power. After a period of transition in 
implementing effective economic, political, social and legal policies, India is poised 
for a strong and sustained growth performance through 2015 (Table 6). The size of its 
population— 1.2 billion by 2015 and its technologically driven economic growth will 










Table 6.  India: key economic indicators 
 Historical Trends Forecasts 
% change over previous 
year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-
2015 
GDP  4.4 5.8 4.0 8.2 6.0 6.5 6.6 6.9 7.1 6.6 6.8 
Industrial production   5.0 2.7 5.8 6.9 7.1 6.9 7.3 7.6 7.8 8.1 8.1 
Consumer Prices 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.3 
Population  1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 
Current Account 
Balance (US$bn) 
-3.6 0.8 4.1 8.7 2.7 0.1 -1.1 -2.3 -1.6 -7.9 -11.2 
Source: Consensus Economics. 
 
Growth will be generally broad based, with significant improvements across all 
sectors. India’s relatively strong educational system, democracy and English-language 
skills will position it well to take advantage of gains related to information 
technology. This has already allowed India to grab market share in the information 
technology and business process outsourcing sectors. But further increases in the 
development of call centres, software development and back office outsourcing will 
completely transform India’s services industry. In principle, India will have the 
potential to be competitive across an even broader range of services. In 
manufacturing, significant increases in production capacity in several industries such 
as automobiles, electronics, chemicals and metals will also occur (Brumby, 2004; 
Thirlwell, 2004). 
 
Though India, like the rest of the world, will be falling behind China, its share in 
world GDP will continue to grow. Compared to China, its population is younger and 
growing faster, so its workforce will continue to expand when China's population 
starts ageing. By 2025 the Indian economy is projected to be about 60per cent the size 
of the US economy. The transformation will be complete by 2035, with the Indian 
economy only a little smaller than the US economy but larger than that of Western 
Europe and Japan, thus taking it to third place, behind the US and China. 
 
India nevertheless will face enormous challenges in spreading the benefits of growth 
to the impoverished, often illiterate citizens, particularly in the northern states.  The 
inefficient agricultural sector highlights the need to improve India’s infrastructure and 
highlights the key role of irrigation and water management in stabilising agricultural 
growth. The Indian government will also need to address environmental and 
sustainable energy supply problems. The persistent strength of global oil prices and 
India’s strong oil import growth will pose a risk to its inflation outlook. However, this 
will not derail India’s economy from becoming the next economic giant as it will not 
want to wait too long before making a move to curb rising inflationary pressures. 
Though India’s economy remains on a high growth path, the effectiveness of ongoing 
economic reforms will be a key determinant of its growth prospects over the long 
term.  
 
United States. The United States will continue to be a major force in the world 
community. It will be the key driver of the international system with its global 
economic, technological, military and diplomatic influence. It will continue to be the 
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leading proponent and beneficiary of globalisation and its economic actions will have 
a major global impact because of the tighter integration of global markets by 2015. 
 
Table 7.  United States: key economic indicators 
 Historical Trends Forecasts 
% change over previous 
year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-
2015 
Real GDP  3.7 0.8 1.9 3.0 4.4 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 
Industrial production   4.4 -3.4 -0.6 0.3 4.6 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.6 
Consumer Prices 3.4 2.8 1.6 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Population  1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Current Account 
Balance (US$bn) 
-413 -386 -474 -531 -640 -671 -669 -663 -650 -618 -557 
Source: Consensus Economics. 
 
GDP growth forecasts for the US will remain optimistic, despite growing concerns 
over the impact of oil prices on activity (Table 7). Industrial activity will continue to 
be positive. Indeed, US long-term expectations will continue to outstrip those for 
Japan due to higher productivity growth and continued progress in technological 
innovation which are shifting growth rates higher and keeping inflation under control. 
However, high energy prices will pose a downside risk to the outlook. Moreover, 
consumer price expectations suggest that the pace of inflation is expected to rise over 
the medium-term.  Another cause for concern is the massive current account deficit 
which, though expected to recede over the next 10 years, will remain large. If this 
large deficit does not recede and remains long-lasting, there will be a loss of 
international confidence in the US growth prospects that could lead to a sharp 
downturn. This would have deleterious economic and policy consequences for the rest 
of the world. Key trading partners would suffer as the world’s largest market contracts 
and international markets could face serious instability. 
 
Japan. The Japanese economy will expand at a relatively slow pace, over the next 10 
years. Japan’s domestic demand will remain muted while the expansion remains 
overly reliant on export demand. In the face of high oil prices and faltering global 
demand, concerns are rife about a sharp deceleration in GDP growth through 2015 
(Table 8). Meanwhile, prices will begin to rise mildly in the next 10 years after a 
number of years of lingering deflation pressures. Japan’s economic performance in 
the next 10 years will be stronger than that of the 1990s, but its relative importance in 
the global economy will decline. China is set to overtake it as one of the largest 
trading economies in the world.3 However, Japan will remain a huge market for 
exports, particularly of the Western Australian resources sector. Japan will maintain 










Table 8.  Japan: key economic indicators 
 Historical Trends Forecasts 
% change over previous 
year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-
2015 
Real GDP  2.8 0.4 -0.3 2.5 4.3 1.8 1.8 1.2 2.1 2.1 1.7 
Industrial production 5.2 -6.5 -1.3 3.3 6.4 2.6 1.9 1.1 2.9 2.5 1.8 
Consumer Prices -0.7 -0.7 -1.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.4 1.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 
Population  0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.04 0.0 -0.03 -0.07 -0.2 
Current Account 
Balance (¥bn) 
12.9 10.7 14.1 15.8 18.5 18.4 19.1 19.0 18.2 18.3 18.2 
Source: Consensus Economics. 
 
RAND (2004) predicts that the pace of Japanese liberalisation, reform and market 
opening would be modest. It has so far not shown willingness to facilitate the 
structural reforms necessary (particularly in the banking sector) to slow the erosion of 
its economic leadership role in Asia. Unlike the rapid growth and competitiveness of 
Japan's economy in the 1980s that caused tension between Japan and other countries, 
particularly the United States, the current slow pace of Japan's economic restructuring 
is unlikely to cause any animosity between countries. 
 
Japan will face a bigger challenge in its demographic shift characterised by slow 
population growth and a rapidly ageing population. By 2007, Japan's population is 
expected to peak at 127 million, and then shrink to less than 100 million by 2050. 
This means 30 million fewer workers at a time when the number of elderly will have 
almost doubled. By the year 2025, one in every three people will be elderly One 
obvious consequence will be pressure on the social-insurance system, including health 
care and pensions, as the working-age population shrinks. . A shrinking workforce 
may also mean slower economic growth. 
 
The social and economic implications of this trend will be significant. For the 
Japanese economy, facing 8 per cent fewer consumers by 2050 means slumping 
domestic sales of cars, hi-tech kit and home appliances, perhaps even another property 
crash. Japan will probably have to let more workers immigrate, though public unease 
will lead it to delay and minimise this shift as much as possible. Japan’s other 
strategies for responding to a serious labour force shortage– enticing overseas 
Japanese to return, broadening the opportunities for women, and increasing 
investments elsewhere in Asia– may prove inadequate. 
 
Europe. Europe has huge economic advantages – its stable democratic government 
and a unified bloc, its investments in infrastructure, some of the greatest global 
companies, a highly skilled workforce, single currency and the promise and as-yet-
unfulfilled potential of the world's biggest single market. Despite these advantages, 
for years European growth has been too slow – averaging an annual 1.7per cent since 
2000 – and unemployment too high. A number of economic forecasts of the European 
future indicates the decline of the economy, slow economic growth because of ageing 
population (hence the growing burden of the elderly) and shrinking workforce (Table 
9). There will be significant shortages of highly skilled workers in IT and other 
professions and unskilled workers in basic services. 
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Table 9. Europe: key economic indicators 
 Historical Trends Forecasts 
% change over previous 
year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-
2015 
Real GDP  3.5 1.6 0.8 0.5 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Industrial production   5.3 0.4 -0.5 0.3 2.2 2.5 2.1 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.0 
Consumer Prices 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 
Population  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Current Account 
Balance (Euro bn) 
-79.1 -17.2 53.4 24.2 45.6 45.7 49.2 49.6 52.0 56.3 59.0 
Source: Consensus Economics. 
* Europe only includes the Eurozone; 
 
The proportion of the 65 and older people in Europe will skyrocket over the next 10 to 
15 years. European countries will need large numbers of new workers because of 
ageing populations and low birth rates. Migration will relieve labour shortages to a 
limited extent but at a cost in terms of social friction and crime. Immigration will be a 
peculiarly sensitive issue in European politics as it complicates political and social 
integration: some political parties will continue to mobilise popular sentiment against 
migrants, protesting the strain on social services and the difficulties in assimilation. 
European countries will face difficult dilemmas in seeking to reconcile protection of 
national borders and cultural identity with the need to address demographic and 
labour market imbalances. This situation could dampen economic growth.  
 
Structural reforms remain key to whether Europe can break out of its slow-growth 
pattern. Apart from social and welfare reform, Europe will need to streamline the 
complicated decision-making process that hinders collective action. Doing just 
enough to keep growth rates at one or two per cent would not enable Europe to play a 
major international role commensurate with its size. Looking out to 2015, Europe’s 
agenda will be to put in place the final components of EU integration. Europe will 
require an outward-looking strategy, embracing the opportunities of globalisation, 
while maintaining its own identity to be able to compete successfully in the global 
economy.  
 
Australia.  Australia will see a certain degree of stability in its economic outlook as 
we look forward to 2015. The relatively stable political and economic environment 
will somewhat be reinforced by what is taking place on the international scene. 
Australia’s economy will be one of the best performers among developed countries 
through 2015, which will be largely driven by wide-ranging structural reforms in 
areas such as industrial relations and privatisation, and more sound monetary and 
fiscal policies. The positive economic growth will be due to consumer spending and 
investment. The sound outlook for inflation and interest rates will ensure that 









Table 10.  Australia: key economic indicators 
 Historical Trends Forecasts 
% change over previous 
year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-
2015 
Real GDP  3.2 2.5 3.9 3.0 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 
Industrial production 5.0 1.2 2.5 1.0 2.2 2.8 2.2 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.8 
Consumer Prices 4.5 4.4 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.5 
Population  1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Current Account 
Balance (A$bn) 
-26.4 -16.6 -31.5 -46.6 -47.0 -43.3 -41.8 -42.7 -43.5 -46.6 -44.9 
Source: Consensus Economics. 
* Europe only includes the Eurozone 
 
Australia will further re-orient its trade towards Asia and the Pacific Rim and away 
from more traditional markets in Europe and the US.  Australia will export more to 
China than to the US. Not only will China import increasing quantities of coal and 
metals from Australia, but its appetite for raw materials will sharply push up global 
commodity prices. This will result in Australia's terms of trade peaking. 
 
Australia will benefit greatly from China’s economic boom, which will demand huge 
amounts of raw materials in the next decade or so. Western Australia with its 
dominant resource sector is poised to benefit most from this trend. Agriculture, 
minerals and fuels which are Australia’s export mainstays will still account for a 
significant share of Australia’s exports by 2015, although at a diminishing rate. 
Manufacturing and services will increasingly become significant contributors to 
Australia’s export generated wealth.  
 
There are downside risks to Australia’s positive growth outlook in the next 10 years. 
One worry will be a softer demand from a commodity-hungry China. If China’s 
overheats, then sooner or later its investment boom will likely to slow sharply, which 
would seriously curb Australian exports and commodity prices. 
 
Table 11.  The Leaderboard in 2015, by population and real GDP 




 2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Australia 19.2 20.1 20.9 21.7 462.2 562.7 665.7 790.6 
US 282.3 295.7 309.2 322.6 9,405.2 11,149.6 13,051.4 15,277.6 
Europe* 305.9 309.0 310.5 312.1 6,049.2 6,471.3 7,316.4 8,117.5 
Japan 126.7 127.4 127.2 125.8 3,199.8 3,485.9 3,807.3 4,142.1 
China 1,268.9 1,306.3 1,347.6 1,393.4 4,754.6 7,096.0 10,368.4 15,024.2 
Korea (Rep. of) 47.3 48.4 49.2 49.7 683.4 857.0 1,096.9 1,373.5 
India 1,002.7 1,080.3 1,155.0 1,227.5 2,779.2 3,735.3 5,190.1 7,211.6 
Source:  US Census Bureau; Eurostats; World Competitiveness Yearbook 2003; 
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